Mariana Islands - US military strategy 'on hold' by Newsham, Grant
Asia Paciﬁc Bulletin 
Mariana Islands – US Military Strategy ‘On Hold’  
BY GRANT NEWSHAM 
A recent Bloomberg arƟcle about the Chinese‐owned Imperial Paciﬁc casino on Saipan in the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) makes a compelling tale of large scale money 
laundering and corrupƟon in local government. However, half of the story is missing.  That is:  Chinese 
resort developers serving, wiƫngly or not, as part of a PRC economic/poliƟcal warfare scheme and 
stymying US military eﬀorts to further develop training areas in the CNMI.  
 
In parƟcular, the US Navy and Marine Corps’ longstanding plan to develop the uninhabited Pagan Island, 
200 miles north of Saipan, as an amphibious training area – the only such US‐controlled training site west 
of Hawaii – is on hold once again. 
 
CNMI and Guam, both American territories, are strategically important given their locaƟons in the 
Western Paciﬁc close to Asia. The well‐developed US naval and air faciliƟes on Guam are especially 
important.  While neither locaƟon has received the aƩenƟon it deserves from Washington – the US Navy 
and Air Force have maintained and are gradually expanding a presence on Guam.  Important mulƟlateral 
naval and air exercises are rouƟnely held in and around Guam and CNMI. Meanwhile, preparaƟons and 
infrastructure construcƟon are underway to eventually move about 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to 
Guam.  But to train Marines (and sailors) for amphibious operaƟons – combining ground, sea, and air 
capabiliƟes – requires space, both ocean and land.  Guam has plenty of the former but not enough of the 
laƩer available. 
 
Marines have been periodically conducƟng limited training on Tinian (near Saipan and part of CNMI) for 
many years, but landing beaches are small and there is not enough room for maneuver once ashore, 
much less to employ a full range of weapons.  This is roughly akin to a baseball team pracƟcing on a 
basketball court.  
 
This is where Pagan Island comes into play; Pagan is big enough and isolated enough to train amphibious 
forces at a necessary scale – and to use nearly all of the necessary weapons as well as to conduct useful 
maneuvers ashore. An amphibious training area on Pagan would also allow US forces to train with 
partner naƟons’ amphibious forces such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and others.  This builds both 
operaƟonal skills and linkages, and also has favorable poliƟcal knock‐on eﬀects as militaries become 
more capable and more interoperable, while also demonstraƟng that Asia’s free naƟons will defend 
themselves. The Pagan plan has been in the works for years, but has proceeded ﬁƞully – partly owing to 
legal challenges claiming environmental, cultural, and archaeological harm, but also due to the US 
military and government giving the maƩer inadequate priority. The ongoing lawsuits against the Pagan 
plan may appear vexaƟous, but they are also a part of the American system.  The US Government has 
plenty of competent legal support and simply needs to make its case – as it did with plans for military 
construcƟon on Guam in recent years.  
 
However, the appearance in the mid‐2000s of Chinese casino/resort developers promising billions of 
dollars in investments and thousands of jobs in Saipan (the capital of CNMI) threw a wrench into the 
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works. The CNMI have a small populaƟon — around 60,000 — and few economic prospects 
aŌer the garment industry closed down in the early 2000s. Outsiders oŌen mistakenly think 
Guam and CNMI are the same.  They are not.  They are separate poliƟcal enƟƟes and have 
diﬀerent socieƟes, though they share culture and history.  Guam also has a larger populaƟon, is 
comparaƟvely robust economically and has a longstanding tolerance – indeed parƟcipaƟon and 
support – for the American military presence. 
 
Although CNMI society has a ‘pro‐US military’ segment that is also suspicious of unchecked 
Chinese development, the Chinese resort developers’ oﬀers were aƩracƟve for many people, 
parƟcularly those in the CNMI government looking for revenue. But part of the deal, both 
implicit and someƟmes explicit, is the idea — sowed by the Chinese developers and oﬀ‐island 
environmentalists — that the US military using CNMI is a bad thing – as tourists will not want to 
come somewhere where the military is making noise, polluƟng, and otherwise upseƫng 
tourists. This is akin in scale and character to a US resort company going to China’s Hainan Island 
and announcing it will invest a few tens of billions dollars in resorts, creaƟng thousands of jobs 
and prosperity, but with one caveat: the People’s LiberaƟon Army will have to leave the island.  
AŌer all, tourists won’t want to come somewhere where the military is operaƟng. It is unlikely 
that Chinese authoriƟes would put up with this. Yet the US government under both current and 
prior administraƟons has shown curious indiﬀerence to Chinese subversion on American 
territory. 
 
It should be noted that companies like Imperial Paciﬁc are not ‘private’ companies in a Western 
sense.  They are best viewed as part of the PRC’s larger strategic ‘inﬂuence’ eﬀorts, and will 
always do the government’s bidding when directed. 
 
While the speciﬁcs vary, Chinese behavior in CNMI is part of a paƩern seen elsewhere in the 
Paciﬁc, such as Micronesia, Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji.  It starts with Chinese ﬁnancial aid and 
investment along with commercial inroads, then Chinese immigrants, leading to inﬂuence over 
local governments, and there is invariably a military angle somewhere down the road. This angle 
can range from Chinese military access to ports and airﬁelds to ‘blocking eﬀorts’ as seen 
throughout Micronesia.  The same basic paƩern plays out in other parts of the world – 
parƟcularly Africa – with Ethiopia, Angola, and DjibouƟ being prime examples. 
 
As for CNMI, the United States will do well to use all intelligence and invesƟgaƟve resources at 
its disposal to protect itself from Chinese subversion.  It is not enough to tell the PRC developers 
to ‘get lost.’   
 
Finally, the U.S. must pay aƩenƟon to CNMI, Guam, and other Paciﬁc Island naƟons, and give 
them an alternaƟve to Imperial Paciﬁc sorts of blandishments.  Even under constrained 
resources, the U.S. must be able to aﬀord a more robust Paciﬁc engagement. One interesƟng 
proposal being quietly pushed by the Japanese is a ‘public‐private’ US‐Japan partnership to 
substanƟally improve infrastructure in CNMI and Guam – and elsewhere in the Paciﬁc islands. 
But it has always been devilishly hard to get anyone who maƩers in Washington interested in 
this region. This must change.  China’s success at establishing de facto control of the South 
China Sea and exerƟng inﬂuence within the so‐called 1st Island Chain, is just a foretaste of what 
is coming to the 2nd Island Chain, which CNMI and Guam anchor.   
 
The US will hopefully wake up, and it will be good if more US oﬃcials can look at a map and 
locate CNMI and Guam without scratching their heads.  
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